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Professionalism under the Legal Services Act 2007  
 
Andrew Boon1 
 
Introduction 
 
Jurisdictions around the world are regulating and re-regulating legal professions or 
considering such changes (Darrois, 2009, Koh et al., 2009). This includes the 
common law countries, where legal professionalism has traditionally been strong   
(Mark and Cowdroy, 2004, Schneyer, 2009, Devlin, 2011 [nb this collection]). The 
decline of professional control and privilege coincides with economic and social 
change, including the drive of the capitalist state towards consumerism and 
commodification (Giddens, 1991). In the UK, the process began in earnest in the 
1980s, when Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government challenged the principle 
of welfarism and sought to tighten state control of public and private sector 
monopolies. The 2007 Legal Services Act (LSA) represents a significant watershed, 
one that might have signalled the death of legal professionalism. In the event the 
LSA created a Legal Services Board (LSB) to oversee regulation of the legal 
services market within a framework of statutory goals, including promotion of an 
independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession.  
Rather than rationalising the professions or abolishing their organisational and 
normative structures, the LSA promises to enshrine professional aspirations and 
principles in legislation while tightening control of professional bodies, influencing the 
professional agenda and shaping the market though competition. This article traces 
the processes by which the LSA is redefining the professions and professionalism in 
England and Wales. It considers construction and organisation of professional work, 
reconstruction of the regulatory system, adjustments in regulatory method and the 
implications for education and training strategies.  The article concludes that the LSA 
establishes relationships and processes that will undermine aspects of traditional 
professionalism and indicates ways in which the legal professions might mitigate 
some of these impacts.  
Legal professionalism in England and Wales  
There is no single model of legal professionalism since the public role of professions 
is defined by their relationship to the state. Different arrangements  have evolved in 
different countries, depending on the processes of professionalization and the 
administrative capacity of states during professional formation (Burrage et al, 1990; 
Siegrist, 2002; Halliday, 1987). In England and Wales, independent professions were 
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assumed to part of the ‗balanced constitution‘, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 
having affirmed the autonomy of many professional, chartered and local bodies, 
including the Bar, as 'little republics' (Burrage, 1997; Sugarman, 1996). This 
contributed to an assumption of immunity from state interference (Weber, 1978) 
bolstered by the proposition that the rule of law hinged on the capacity and 
inclination of the judiciary to hold public officials, including Ministers, to account in 
the exercise of their powers (Dicey, 1962). In England and Wales, a judiciary drawn 
from barrister practitioners consider an independent legal profession to be ‗scarcely 
less important‘ to maintaining the rule of law than an independent judiciary (Bingham, 
2010:92).  
 
Solicitors, the other main branch of the profession in England and Wales, flourished  
during the nineteenth century at the centre of the capitalist, middle class social 
revolution. They achieved a relationship of trust with the state and eventually parity 
of esteem with the Bar (Sugarman, 1996; 84, Boon and Levin, 2008: 51) but not a 
constitutional role. The challenge to this professional idyll is recent. Even in 1979 a 
Royal Commission on Legal Services (Benson, 1979) made a large number of 
recommendations but little change of the status quo. Reform of the legal profession 
was, however, on the agenda from 1987, when the solicitors' conveyancing 
monopoly was ended by the creation of the profession of licensed conveyancers.2 
Solicitors' charges for conveyancing tumbled even before competition with licensed 
conveyancers began in earnest (Domberger and Sherr, 1989), at least initially 
(Stephen et al, 1994) vindicating and encouraging the policy of competition. This 
success also appeared to cast the rule of law as an inhibitor on executive power to 
achieve distributive justice (Nicol, 2010; 38).  
 
The beginning of a sustained effort by the state to control the 'little republics' met 
with a bitter campaign waged by the judges to limit the ‗damage‘ threatened by Lord 
Mackay‘s Green Papers (Abel, 2003; Zander, 1990). Eventually, the Courts and 
Legal Services Act 1990 achieved a revolutionary recalibration of the roles of 
solicitors and barristers, giving solicitors rights of audience in higher courts. In return, 
the Bar, which had insisted on receiving instructions only from solicitors for the 
previous two centuries, unenthusiastically agreed to accept instructions from a list of 
other professions. These changes in professional jurisdiction (Abbott, 1986) had little 
practical impact on the conduct of advocacy (Boon and Flood, 1999) but affirmed 
competition as the policy of choice. Demanding justification for any measure that 
might restrict supply of professional services the Office of Fair Trading whittled away 
remaining differences between the professions, for example, direct access by lay 
clients to approved barristers (Flood and Whyte, 2009). Other influences on the 
standardisation of practice modes were international legal practice (Faulconbridge et 
al, 2011) and European competition policy (Lee, 2010). 
 
Sir David Clementi's report in 2004 threatened a more serious blow to legal 
professionalism. Clementi was asked to consider 'what regulatory framework would 
best promote competition, innovation and the public consumer interest in an efficient, 
effective and independent legal sector' (Clementi, 2004). Serious consideration was 
given to the replacement of the professional bodies by a single legal services 
regulator, but while Clementi was unimpressed by the confusing plethora of 
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processes surrounding consumer complaints, the volume of complaints to the Law 
Society and its record in handling them (Clementi, 2004, Ch.3) he came down in 
favour what could be seen as a compromise. Opting for a second tier public agency 
overseeing the key players in the legal services market, Clementi explained that:   
The current system has produced a strong and independently minded profession, operating in 
most cases to high standards, able to compete successfully internationally. These strengths 
would suggest that the failings of the system, identified in the Scoping Study and covered in 
this Review, should be tackled by reform starting from where we are, rather than from scratch. 
(Clementi, Ch. 2 para 32)  
The Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA), which enacted Clementi‘s regulatory half way 
house, was then expected to signal the vision of legal practice as a business: 
 
'What has emerged confounds this analysis. Rather than ditch finally the illusions and 
pretensions of professionalism, the UK reforms have instead sought to enshrine key elements 
of professionalism in a market model. In England at least, law should be both a business and a 
profession'.(Whelan, 2008, p.491)  
 
This raises questions about how legal professionalism is defined, both theoretically 
and practically. 
 
Functional analysis of professions perceived that they fulfil an essential and 
beneficial social role (Durkheim, 1992, 11; Parsons, 1954) while economic theories 
tend to view professional ideology as a smokescreen for market exploitation 
(Larsson, 1977; Abbott, 1988; Abel,1988). There have been various attempts to 
identify professions by their attributes or traits (Greenwood, 1957; Burrage et al, 
1990), but common law countries have tended to see professionalism as a means of 
controlling occupations through self regulation rather than state or community control 
(Johnson, 1972). The rationale of professionalism is that consumers benefit from 
experts regulating their own markets in a spirit of public service, albeit in their long 
term interests. Halliday (1987) observes that the security of professional monopoly 
enables lawyers to genuinely consider the public good while Paterson (1996) 
considered the loss of the conveyancing monopoly a demonstration of how the 
professions' compact with the state might be adjusted.  
 
Parker (1999) argues that 'neo-contractual' approaches to professionalism accept 
that professional failings can only lead to state sanction, like the removal of 
monopoly. This may be an undesirable option in many circumstances and one that 
denies the possibility of dialogue with stakeholders with a view to improved 
performance. Treating lawyers as collectively untrustworthy risks both the sense of 
responsibility that potentially accompanies self-regulation and the will to co-operate 
with reform (Parker, 1999; 124-134). Parker therefore envisages a 'democratic 
theory of professionalism' whereby the profession is 'held accountable to the justice 
concerns of the community...' with reporting by practitioners against 'performance 
indicators that profession, state and community agree to be fair' (Parker, 1999;144). 
Such an approach demands a regulatory approach reconciling trust and distrust, 
flexible enough to deal with the fact that the profession is segmented, complex and 
ambiguous (Parker, 1999: 138) and able to harness the altruistic impulse of 
professionalism while controlling the risks of cartelization (Parker,1999, p.109). 
Sommerlad, however, senses an inherent paradox in this aspiration, the LSA 
reflecting, on the one hand:   
`... belief that 'professional ethics' are a thin disguise for professional rent-seeking... on the 
other hand are appeals to lawyers to adopt an ethic of public service and good conduct.' 
(Sommerlad 2010; 95) 
 
Previous attempts by the state to regulate legal services directly, through franchise 
agreements and block contracts imposed on legal aid providers, were resented by 
the profession (Boon and Levin 2008: 61). Sommerlad (1995) likened the regulatory 
mechanisms used for regulating legal aid firms to those used by the Thatcher 
governments for restructuring, organising and managing public services. These 
methods, New Manageralism and New Public Management (Deem et al., 2007), 
were loosely coupled innovations offering a flexible balance between strategic and 
operational control, producing 'regulated autonomy' for the regulated within 
underlying normative principles (Hoggett, 1996). The tools of these strategies are 
audit and transparency regimes, which demand system wide, self reinforcing 
transitions in administrative forms and decision making processes. Professionalism, 
an ideology that assumes that expert producers are best placed to supply consumer 
need, proceeds from a different basic premise to Manageralism, an ideology that 
management is necessary to economic progress, technological development and 
order. 
 
This brief history and review of the theoretical context of professionalism is a 
background to two broad interpretations of the LSA. On one hand, competition and a 
more explicit external focus will reinvigorate legal professionalism. Therefore, the 
LSA may allow lawyers to reconstruct as a liberal profession (Flood, 2010), or 
operate as a corrective to professional failings (Maute, 2010), build a new version of 
professionalism on a responsive form of regulation (Parker, 1999, Webb, 2004). On 
the other hand, the purpose of the LSA is to compromise or destroy professionalism, 
at least as a mechanism of occupational control. Therefore, the LSA represents the 
interests of the state and private capital in controlling professional work (Freidson 
1988), or a process of capitalist concentration and rationalisation reflecting political 
faith in market mechanisms and a rhetorical assault on justice as a public good 
(Sommerlad, 2010) or, according to Lord Neuberger, Master of the Rolls, a threat the 
rule of law from 'consumer fundamentalism' (Legal Futures, 2010a). The reality may 
lie between these extremes, but, assuming it survives, the LSA will redefine legal 
professionalism.   
In England and Wales the ability of professional bodies to set and police standards 
of behaviour, use the capitalised value of education, training and experience to 
command resources and control entry (Houle, 1980; Schein, 1972; Larsson, 1977; 
Abel, 1988) remain, but are increasingly weakened. Kritzer (1999) argues that this 
‗traditional professionalism‘ is distinguished from the sociological concept, which is 
based on exclusive membership and the application of abstract knowledge. Kritzer 
argues that the formal professions like law are losing their uniqueness and being 
eclipsed by professions generally. Freidson considers that the 'worst and not unlikely 
possibility is that professionals will be slowly transformed into especially privileged 
technical workers' (1988; 209). This moves legal professionalism closer to Perkin 
(1989), who argued that the professional ideal, trained expertise and selection by 
merit, as judged by similarly educated experts, permeates society as a vision of the 
ideal citizen. This version of professionalism is stripped down, generalised, assuming 
an almost colloquial meaning. Such a view is increasingly reflected in the focus of 
the sociological analysis of professionalism on issues of professional identities, 
competence and responsibility (Evetts 2003).  
 
Freidson (1988) identifies core denominators of professionalism as expertise, 
credentialism and autonomy,3  in which discretion plays a key part. Sciulli ( 2005) 
emphasises professional 'commitment to institutional design and ongoing 
deliberation' whereby professions manifest responsibility for determining how client 
needs are met. Others (Pound, 1953;40, Boon and Levin, 2008;306) assert the 
importance of collegial frameworks, which support the discipline and the public 
service ethos. These normative and structural dimensions of professionalism may be 
vulnerable to  regulatory change that replaces collaboration with competition as the 
dominant cultural imperative. The use of managerial regulatory models may transfer 
professional discretion to 'external monitors of those procedures and skills' 
(Sommerlad, 1995, p.182). Audit methods that are said to have transformed higher 
education 'communities of scholars' into conventional workplaces (Deem et al. 2007) 
may operate to replace the collegiality of professional legal practice with rational 
bureaucracy. It remains to be seen whether the implicit failure of professional 
ideology will drive the legal profession ‗towards the maximisation of profit and the 
minimisation of discretion‘ (Freidson, 2100, p.220) or whether the erosion of 
professional ideology can be mitigated.  
 
A. Regulatory relationships under the LSA 
 
The Legal Services Board (LSB) is a classic second tier agency, of a type typically 
charged with controlling cartelization, laying down minimum quality standards for  
first tier, front line regulators and acting 'as a proxy for insufficiently informed 
consumers' (Ogus, 1995; 106). These roles are reflected in the regulatory objectives 
of the LSA, which the LSB is bound to promote (LSA 2007 s.3(2)). They are 
protecting and promoting the public interest; supporting the constitutional principle of 
the rule of law; improving access to justice; protecting and promoting the interests of 
consumers; promoting competition in the provision of services…; encouraging an 
independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession; increasing public 
understanding of the citizen's legal rights and duties; promoting and maintaining 
adherence to the professional principles (LSA 2007 s. 1(1)(a)-(h)). The ―professional 
principles‖ referred to in the last objective, require for example, that authorised 
persons act with independence and integrity, maintain proper standards of work and 
client confidentiality, act in the best interests of clients and, when exercising rights of 
audience or conducting litigation, comply with their duty to the court to act with 
independence in the interests of justice (LSA s.1(3) (a) - (e)).  
Under the LSA, the ‗authorised persons‘ bound by the professional principles are 
defined by six tasks, the 'reserved legal activities', identified by the LSA as rights of 
audience, conduct of litigation, work on reserved instruments, probate work, notarial 
work and administration of oaths (LSA 2007 s.12(1) and Schedule 2). Those entitled 
to carry on these activities are authorised, or exempt,4 in relation to that activity (LSA 
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s.13(2)) or permitted to carry out that activity by a body licensed for that reserved 
legal activity by an approved licensing authority(LSA s.18(1)). A licensed body is one 
governed by Part 5 of the Act, under which Alternative Business Structures (ABS) 
are permitted (LSA, 2007 s.71(2)). Such bodies will be operational from October 
2011 and are licensable under the Act if a non-authorised person is a manager or 
has an interest (LSA, 2007 s.72). Some essentially legal work, immigration advice, 
claims management and insolvency, for example, are not regulated under the LSA 
but by other statutes. Others, will writing for example, are not regulated by any 
statute but may be indirectly regulated because the person carrying out the work is a 
licensed by professional body (Mayson and Marley, 2010).  
Before the Legal Services Act 2007 the seven professions that are now approved, or 
'front line', regulators under the LSB, controlled the legal services market in England 
and Wales. The largest, The Law Society represents over sixty thousand solicitors. 
Practicing in organisations ranging from large commercial and international law firms 
to local firms and sole practitioners, solicitors provide the bulk of services direct to 
clients. Around twelve thousand barristers offer specialist advocacy services and 
advice. They do not generally act for clients direct but, through the intermediation of 
solicitors. Although solicitors have been able to obtain rights of audience in higher 
courts since the 1990s, and barristers to act directly for clients (Flood and Whyte, 
2009), each profession appear to have continued as before, rejecting the opportunity 
to conduct the work traditionally associated with the other (Boon and Levin, 2008; 49, 
Ch. 2).  
The most significant numerically of the remaining occupations are the twenty 
thousand legal executives belonging to the Institute of Legal Executives, an 
approved regulator (Francis, 2002). These sometimes become senior members and 
partners in solicitors' firms but many tend to work mainly under the direction of 
solicitors. Additionally, there are smaller numbers of licensed conveyancers, patent 
and trade mark attorneys, law costs draughtsmen and notaries, providing specialist 
advice and services, either to law firms or private clients. Estimates that the number 
working in the legal services market could be as many as 300,000, suggest that 
many 'para-legal' workers, including many with legal qualifications but unable to find 
work as solicitors or barristers, could be outside the ambit of approved regulators.   
In addition to covering a diverse group of legally related professions, the LSB 
oversees a diverse legal services market. This includes two accountancy bodies 
approved in relation to provision of reserved probate services, a range of sectors 
(private, employed), work type (corporate, private client), modes of delivery 
(traditional/ face to face, legal process outsourcing provider (LPO) (Das, 2010, Sako, 
2010)) and culture (enterprise or social service) (Hanlon, 1998). Each of the 
approved regulators has their own professional body, ethical code and disciplinary 
system, albeit at different stages of development. The disciplinary codes of each 
profession have similar elements but with differences. For example, the barristers' 
code is largely concerned with advocacy, reflecting the fact that barristers are sole 
practitioners obliged to accept any brief. The solicitors' code reflects the fact that 
they deal with clients direct and can refuse clients except on grounds that are 
discriminatory. These micro-ethical regimes follow the practitioner in whichever 
activity, sector or organisation they are engaged, creating a market of considerable 
ethical complexity. Meanwhile there are potential regulatory gaps over areas such as 
will writing and legal services outsourced overseas (Ross, 2010). 
Whelan (2008; 487) suggests that international concern about the independence of 
the legal profession prevented the LSB chair being a direct political appointment and 
the LSB having power to intervene in the operations of the frontline regulators. In the 
event, the relationship of the LSB and the professions under the LSA is essentially 
co-regulatory. Prior to the LSA, the Lord Chancellor, initially on the advice of the Lord 
Chancellors' Advisory Committee for Education and Conduct (ACLEC), with 
significant judicial involvement, approved changes to conduct rules. The 
arrangement whereby the LSB is now the approver is broadly similar, but, the LSB is 
an administrative agency with much clearer accountability to the Ministry of Justice 
and Parliament.  Moreover, whereas, Lord Chancellors are lawyers, and sometime 
defenders of professions (Abel, 2003), the intention is that agencies such as the LSB 
resist 'regulatory capture' by the regulated.  
The chances of regulatory capture of the LSB by professions are reduced by the 
relationships required by the LSA. The professional body of the solicitors, the Law 
Society of England and Wales (The Law Society), and of the barristers, the General 
Council of the Bar of England and Wales (Bar Council), are confined to promoting 
the interests of members (LSA s27(2)) and any decisions taken in relation to the 
regulatory function must be taken independently (LSA s.30(1)). Anticipating this 
requirement the Law Society created the Solicitors Regulatory Authority (SRA), and 
the Bar Council created the Bar Standards Board, to manage regulatory activity at 
arm's length. This insulates the LSB from direct contact with the representative 
professions and possibly, even, from contact with lawyers depending on the 
composition of the regulatory arms of the professions. If these are not already in 
sympathy with the mission of the oversight regulator there are an array of sanctions 
that can be applied to approved regulators, from performance targets, monitoring 
and directions (LSA ss.31-34), to penalties, public censure, fines, intervention and 
cancellation of approval (LSA ss.35-48).  
The LSB originally presented itself as the last chance to marry 'the strong heritage of 
professional self-regulation' and ‗best practice lessons from the models of consumer 
and market regulation widely in place elsewhere‘ before implementation of 
'wholesale statutory regulation, with progressive loss of public confidence in the 
concept of a profession‘ (LSB 2009; para. 10). The LSB Chairman recently softened 
this stance, suggesting his role was enabling ‗... lawyers to react as flexibly as 
possible to [an] ever changing landscape‘ and 'liberalising the market to stimulate 
innovation' (Edmonds, 2010). The LSB has been true to a promise to engage with 
the research community, commission research, including for the consumer panel, 
and convene ad hoc external advisory groups (LSB 2009; para 132-3). Indeed, 
although it is not a novel question (Bishop, 1989), the LSB has even sought advice 
on the economic justification for regulation from economists Decker and Yarrow  
(2010).  
 
The surprising aspect of the LSB's economists' report is the considerable doubt it 
casts on the reliability of modern neo-classical economics, the quest for an 
unachievable ideal of 'perfect competition'  and the propensity to 'find' 'market failure' 
to justify public regulation (Decker and Yarrow, 2010; 9-11 and see Bishop et al, 
1995). It suggests that the well recognised problem, information asymmetries 
between producers and consumers, are too costly to eliminate completely. One of 
the best methods or informing consumers is producer reputation, a key function of 
professions (Decker and Yarrow, 2010; 35). Professional badges, such as the 
Queens Counsel, are therefore ambiguous, representing either a helpful indicator of 
quality or a limitation of supply that drives up price. The economists' report notes that 
oversight regulation is both a tax on the regulated and a way of shifting rents 
between competing interest groups. What it does not mention is that the LSB is 
potentially a competitor as a front line regulator, either of ABS if no other authorised 
bodies come forward or in the event of the future collapse of professional regulation. 
To some extent, therefore, the future of the professions depends on number of 
factors, not least their viability and performance following restructuring of the supply 
side of the market. The advice concludes that one of the key justifications for the 
regulation of legal services is that justice is a common good, in the same way as 
commodities like water, a view that is supported by the antecedents to the LSA and 
some of its priorities.5   
 
During the 1990s lawyers were blamed for rising legal aid costs and declining access 
to justice. Lord Woolf‘s reforms, which weakened lawyers‘ control of litigation 
processes (Woolf, 1996) were deemed inadequate because they did not address 
lawyers‘ financial incentives for complicating litigation (Zuckerman, 1996). This 
stimulated the thought that, if lawyers were the problem, non-lawyers might be the 
solution (Moorhead et al 2003). Legal aid is unlikely to stem a rising tide of litigants in 
person (Hirsch, 2011) and the LSA seeks market solutions to increasing access to 
justice. The LSA regime offers various strategies for breaking down the legal 
professions without actually abolishing them. The first is to eradicate practical 
distinctions, for example, by demanding justifications of professional demarcation  
arrangements against competition criteria (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; 296). This leads 
to the second, which is to stimulate competition between them for the same kinds of 
work. The third is to encourage mingling of different professionals within 
organisations. The fourth is to encourage competition between lawyers and non-
lawyers, the main vehicle for which are Alternative Business Structures (ABS). 
Licensing authorities for ABS are, for example, under a specific obligation, when 
considering applications for a licence (in compliance with duties under section 3(2) or 
28(2)) to take account, inter alia, of the objective of improving access to justice.  
 
The introduction of ABS is one of the strategic aims of the LSA and the LSB regards 
establishing them as a priority from the point of view of promoting competition and 
consumer interests (LSB, 2009;  para 65). They are intended to add new providers 
and capital to the legal services market, stimulating investment in technology and 
enabling commoditisation of routine legal work. This could reduce fees, even for core 
legal activities like litigation (Susskind, 2008; Edmonds, 2009) by enabling one stop 
shops for legal and related services (HMSO, 2006; para.5.5. and 5.26), stimulating 
‗new and innovative ways of meeting consumer demand‘, improved access to justice 
for those ineligible for legal aid, ‗improved customer experience‘ and ‗legal service 
professions as diverse as the communities they serve‘ (LSB, 2009; para. 6). In 
addition to stimulating domestic competition ABS might also be a vehicle for 
promoting the City of London‘s international law firms. The competitive advantages 
available to highly capitalised, multi-disciplinary organisations might concern US 
lawyers (Davis, 2010) but it is unclear whether ABS will be able to exploit any such 
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advantages (Schneyer, 2010). Legal professions, even in Europe, are resisting multi-
disciplinary practice (Lee, 2010) and in Wouters (2002) the European Court held that, 
while European Community competition laws apply, they may reasonably restrict 
new business forms considered incompatible with the proper practice of law. 
The impact that competition between producers will have on the cost of legal 
services is unknown. Decker and Yarrow (2010; 44-49) note that there no evidence 
of cartel activity among barristers or solicitors and no research evidence to support 
the idea that lawyers' fees are excessive. The obvious potential for savings therefore 
lies in using unqualified staff, since US research suggests that salaries of 
professional workers are higher than those of non-professionals, even allowing for 
factors like education (and see Lee, 2010). ABS must, however, use approved 
persons to deliver reserved legal activities and ensure that any non-lawyers 
employees do not cause breaches of such rules (LSA Schedule 11, para. 16 and 
s.90). This does not quite eliminate the potential for cost savings and it has been 
estimated that the use of unqualified staff for non-reserved activities could lead to 
pay reductions of up to a half for those working in affected fields (Rothwell, 2008). 
These considerations, together with reductions in associates being employed by 
firms, may explain a forty per cent growth of numbers of students taking Institute of 
Legal Executive Fellowships, the main para-legal qualification, at the stage 
equivalent to A level in 2010 (Rayner, 2010).  
While Decker and Yarrow (2010) conclude that economic analysis provides no clear 
cut answer to the most efficient way to 'bundle' services, ABS will bring more 
commoditised legal products to the legal services market. Online solutions made 
available for direct use by the end user, on a DIY basis are an aspiration underlying 
the current reforms and an outcome predicted by the LSB (LSB, 2009; para. 12). 
Susskind (2010) predicts that ABS will accelerate the domination of the private client 
market by commoditised solutions. This is because non-lawyer capital will be more 
motivated to build technological infrastructure and less inhibited by the professional 
assumptions of lawyers. ABS may encourage more self-help among consumers and 
even corporate work may be susceptible to 'un-bundling'. The results are not always 
predictable. Using para-legals for aspects of complex transactions, for example, may 
result in fewer lawyers, but release those remaining for direct contact with clients 
(Griffiths, 2011).  Some predict, however, that conventional legal businesses could 
shrink to core activity like dispute resolution and problem solving (Susskind, 2008).  
 
The position of the Bar in the new market is interesting for a number of reasons. First, 
as a specialist advocacy and consultancy profession it might be viewed as an 
expensive anachronism. Indeed, the BSB chair, Baroness Deech, perceives that the 
LSA could be ‗… hidden plot to crush the Bar out of all recognition‘ but urges the Bar 
to compete using '... independence of spirit and shouldering of responsibility; by 
economy of overheads and by the collegiality fostered by the Inns‘ (Deech, 2010). 
The market case for barristers is that they offer high quality advice and counsel to 
the lowliest, or most remote, solicitors‘ firms, providing a realistic means of accessing 
justice in a market where standardised solutions generally suffice. When solicitors 
became eligible to gain higher rights of audience, most still supported the retention of 
an independent bar because of the difficulty of keeping a broad base of advocacy 
expertise in-house (Boon et al, 1996, Boon and Flood, 1999). The Bar has a highly 
evolved infrastructure supporting advocacy involving the Inns of Court which 
solicitors do not have and which will be difficult to emulate (Baksi, 2010).  
Bishop (1999) notes that the loss of advocacy specialisation may produce a 
superficial reduction in cost to clients, but actually produce lower quality and higher 
system costs, including more litigants in person (Hirsch, 2010). Specialisation in 
advocacy not only ensures greater efficiency in the court system, but may also 
contribute to higher quality decision making, and therefore precedents, through the 
sophistication of argument and the ability of judges who were themselves expert 
advocates. Loss of an independent bar could undermine the constitutional protection 
of the rule of law (Kentridge, 1998, Kerridge and Davis 1999). While critics might 
argue that an independent bar has merely served to produce an elite judiciary 
(Barmes and Malleson, 2011) an independent bar is, at a minimum, more likely to 
enhance confidence in the rule of law (Sommerlad, 1995).   
The future of the bar is pivotal to professional diversity since its demise would mark 
the end of significant differentiation, possibly hastening fusion of the professions 
under a single front-line regulator, possibly the SRA. The Bar is already conscious of 
commercial threats, with legal aid work drying up and solicitors keeping more 
advocacy in-house. If there is more aggregation in larger units, both traditional firms 
and new entities, more barristers may be forced to work in organisations eroding 
barristers' unique role. This is far from inevitable. Susskind predicts that some areas 
of traditional, bespoke service, which the Bar epitomises, could thrive in technology 
dominated legal markets. The highly profitable commercial, chancery, tax and 
intellectual property sets, should survive, but common law sets and those doing 
publicly funded work will be under greater pressure. 
The theory that barristers would defect to ABS was tested by the introduction of 
Legal Disciplinary Practices (LDPs),6 established under regulation by the SRA from 
March 2009. LDPs were able to appoint non-solicitor lawyers, potentially barristers, 
and non-lawyer managers. The SRA and Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal acquired 
new powers to impose sanctions on practices and non-solicitor managers and 
employees regulated by the SRA. By September 2009, one hundred and five LDPs 
had been established, containing one hundred and twenty five non-solicitor partners 
(Baksi, 2009a).7 None of those working in LDPs were, at that time, barristers, 
because the BSB was undecided about permitting barrister participation. Approval 
was finally given in November 2009, but by June 2010, nine months after LDPs were 
authorised, only ten barristers were known to have become partners (Legal Futures, 
2010b). A recent survey of nearly two thousand barristers showed that more than a 
third anticipated joining a new business structure in the next five years (Legal 
Futures, 2010c). While a third of these envisaged joining barrister only entities, large 
numbers preferring ABS and LDP provide the bar with food for thought.8  
 
The evident uncertainty of the Bar's response to barristers joining SRA regulated 
entities was reflected in a consultation on whether the BSB should become an entity 
regulator (BSB 2010). The paper recommended that the Bar regulate entities 
focused on providing ‗advocacy and related services‘, principally litigation, but even 
this restricted focus presented serious issues. For barristers to offer a litigation 
service that could compete with solicitors for convenience, they would need to be 
able to take money for fees, leading to various proposals by which they would avoid 
having to operate client accounts. Other compromises involve introducing conflict of 
                                            
6
 LDPs will be treated as ABS from Oct 2012 (para 50) Architecture of Justice 2. 
7
 The partners included licensed conveyancers, legal executives, accountants and a patent attorney.  
8
 Barrister only entities were favoured by 23%, ABS by 21% and LDPs by 17%. 
interest provisions and potentially compromising the cab rank rule. Moreover, the 
logic of opening the door to entity regulation, for example by accepting Barrister Only 
Entities initially, drove the BSB to consider also regulating LDPs and ABS. Then, if 
they were to accept practices that would be necessary in an entity, they might have 
to apply the same acceptance to independent practitioners, so that they were not at 
a competitive disadvantage with entities. In short, if the Bar were to regulate entities, 
barristers would move significantly closer to the solicitors' business model.  
 
It is difficult to see how replicating a service that can be, and already is, offered by 
many solicitors' firms fits within the Bar‘s current raison d’etre. Indeed, it seems likely 
that barrister entities might be undercut by solicitors‘ firms able to brief independent 
barristers with lower overheads. This does not seem to meet the public interest 
criterion of promoting a more independent, diverse and strong legal profession. 
Rather, the BSB regulating entities appears to be a concession to a section of the 
Bar that is currently at the margins of the Bar‘s core work. Preserving their 
distinctiveness, would involve employed barristers being subject to the cab rank rule 
and receiving instructions from solicitors in the entity. This may be considered to be 
either too difficult or insufficient to maintain independence, in which case the 
alternative was succinctly put by the chief executive of one London criminal set:  
 
‗... the title of barrister indicates someone who is ‗independent‘ and bound by the cab-rank rule 
not to select whom they represent. If people want to operate ‗client exclusionary practices‘, 
based on commercial considerations, they could – but should become solicitors.'(Baksi, 2009b)  
 
An alternative path to the Bar regulating entities, is to play to the strengths identified 
by Baroness Deech, chair of the BSB, who advocated that the Bar strive to maintain 
distinctiveness and to remain a niche regulator, in an ideal world, of all advocates 
who agree to follow the cab rank rule. The proposition that there should be a single 
regulator for advocacy was reiterated at the Bar Standards Board Annual 
Conference, by Lord Neuberger, Master of the Rolls, and assented to by the 
chairman of the LSB, David Edmonds. Such a consensus suggests an opportunity to 
consider whether the legal profession might be better organised for current needs. 
into occupations. Kerridge and Davis (1999) suggest that these could be general 
practitioners (including some advocacy), specialist non-advocates, generalist 
advocates and specialist advocates. Whether these or other categories might justify 
the creation of new professions is moot.  
 
The LSB chair's support for regulation by function is controversial given that 
competition between regulators, as well as between regulated, is implicit in the LSA 
(Legal Futures, 2010). There could be a need for independent advocates in a market 
in which conflicts of interest may increase. Independent advocates are not subject to 
pressures and obligations endemic in large organisations‘ and the duty to the court is 
therefore more secure. The cab rank rule ensures that advocates are available to all 
at the point of need, rather than being corralled in large firms and, because of it, 
barristers can and will defend clients that commercially minded organisations will 
ignore (Deech, 2010). The BSB's dilemma is that if it does not compete on regulation 
it may become marginal, leading to barristers and advocacy eventually being 
swallowed up by the solicitors. As soon as the legal professions regulate the same 
thing in the same way, their individual identity is lost and their purpose with it. The 
survival of the Bar as the advocacy regulator may be in the public interest. Bringing it 
about would require a new professional settlement, but it is unclear whether the LSB 
could or would play broker. 
 
B. Regulatory philosophy 
 
Decker and Yarrow (2010, p.5) define regulation as the institutional superstructure 
that governs interactions between economic agents, comprising rules ranging from 
the most formal, statutes, to the most informal, customs. The distinction between 
public regulation and self regulation comes down to the question of who is 
responsible for development and enforcement of the 'rule book', which is, typically, 
considerably wider than the code of conduct. The LSA adopts a similarly wide 
definition, an authorised body's 'regulatory arrangements' including everything from 
authorisation to compensation procedures, practice and conduct rules (LSA 2007 
s.21(1)). The LSB is under a statutory obligation to ensure that regulatory activities 
are 'transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in 
which action is needed, and ... any other principle appearing to it to represent the 
best regulatory practice' (LSA 2007; s3(3)). This is a legislative endorsement of 
'better regulation' principles, developed by a commission under the oversight of the 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.  
 
The regulatory strategy of the professions is to apply rules to individuals. Assuming 
some level of transgression, securing compliance depends on a twin strategy of 
training and deterrence. Deterrence relies on ethical infractions being detected 
through audit, or as a result of references from public authorities, like courts, clients 
or other lawyers. The weakness of this approach is that audit is expensive and 
exceptional. Detection by other means is random at best and unlikely to detect 
certain kinds of infraction, for example, those committed for clients' benefit.  A more 
basic criticism is that such conventional regulation is not 'reflexive' (Nicolson and 
Webb, 1999, p.93). Ideal processes might provide routine oversight of the impact of 
regulatory processes on practice, space for dialogue between regulator and 
regulated and scope to share successful strategies with the regulated community 
(Parker 1999, Chambliss, 2001), but methodologies are largely unproven. Yet 
another consideration is facilitating international legal practice, which detailed 
conduct rules might inhibit (Lee, 2010). 
 
The main plank of the strategy set out in the LSB‘s first business plan was a move 
from rule-based to principles-based regulation (PBR) and risk-based regulation (LSB 
2009, para. 30). Principles based regulation (PBR) is one of a suite of approaches, 
with risk based regulation, internal management and controls and market based 
regulation, promoted as an alternative to the focus, in rule based regulation, on 
observance rather than outcome. Favoured by scholars and policy makers for the 
past ten years under the banner of 'new governance' techniques, PBR was tried and 
tested in the financial services industry as an alternative to the 'nit-picking 
bureaucracy [of rule based regulation] in which compliance with detailed provisions 
is more important than ... the overall outcome' (Black 2010; 3).  
 
Black (2010) suggests that the abandonment of rules is a misguided response to 
perceived regulatory failure. Distinguishing between formal and substantive PBR, 
Black suggests that formal PBR, operates at the level of the rule book, where most 
regimes supplement principles with guidance, explanations and, indeed, rules 
((Black  2010; 5). The substantive features of principles based regulation can vary 
greatly, but usually involves focus on the suitability of the firms‘ management 
systems and controls for ensuring compliance with the regulatory outcomes, defined 
in qualitative or behavioural terms, desired by the regulator. The processes 
employed usually include intense dialogue between involved actors about the 
purpose and application of the principles, but the burden of interpretation and 
responsibility for achieving outcomes is on the regulated firm. The formal aspects of 
the PBR regime is generally no clue to its substantive nature; detailed rules might 
co-exist with an approach that is 'light touch'.     
 
As the SRA considered how it might regulate the solicitors under the LSA, The Law 
Society commissioned two reports in 2008. For the first, the former Tory politician 
and life peer, currently chair of the financial services division of Beachcroft LLP, Lord 
Hunt of Wirral, was asked to consider '... the appropriate regulatory rules, monitoring 
and enforcement regime to ensure high standards of integrity and professionalism 
for solicitors and their firms in all sectors...' (Hunt, 2009). For the second, Nick 
Smedley, a former civil servant, was asked to report on the regulation of corporate 
legal work as a sub-strand of the Hunt review. Lord Hunt in his role as Chairman of 
the Financial Services Division of solicitors Beachcroft LLP was familiar with PBR 
and advocated it in his report. The financial services crash of 2007, presaging the 
worst financial crises since the 1930s, caused the Financial Services Authority to 
announce a new focus on 'outcomes focused regulation' (OFR) (Wilson 2010). This 
did not reflect a change in philosophy but in substantive regime, which promised ‗a 
greater depth of analytical rigour‘ and intention to ‗proactively look to influence 
outcomes, not merely react to events‘ (Pain 2010). This involved stronger emphasis 
on monitoring and inspection involving more investigations and ‗intensive 
supervision‘.  
 
Smedley also endorsed the shift to 'principles based regulation' for large firms. He 
advised that: 
 
'The English and Welsh solicitors‘ profession should aspire to be not just commercially 
successful, but also a role model and world leader in the ethical conduct of business – and the 
regulator should be helping the profession achieve this goal. In a time of ever-increasing ethical 
fragility, and a crisis in public confidence in the ethics of our business and political leaders, such 
a position would offer enormous market strength' (Smedley, 2009; i).  
 
Smedley detected considerable unrest among some large firms about the way the 
SRA operated in relation to them. His alleged that the SRA had inherited no 
expertise and insufficient understanding of corporate or international legal work to 
provide either an effective method or system of regulation. This had led to 'a 
breakdown of trust and relationships between the sector and its regulator over recent 
years' (Smedley 2009; p. iii). In his view, simply scaling up the traditional model of 
regulation for large, corporate firms would not work; firms must be ‗expert in risk 
management, rather than the SRA attempting to regulate the risks directly‘ (Smedley, 
2009; 21 para 2.36).  
 
SRA regulation was inappropriate for large firms, Smedley said, because it 
represented detailed and prescriptive regulation characterising relatively low impact, 
high probability risks, like the individual default of sole practitioners (Smedley, 2009 
2.27-2.29). In his view, 'effective regulation of the sector needs to be holistic, 
covering the development and refinement of appropriate practice rules, ad hoc 
regulatory guidance, training and so on' (Smedley, 2009 p. 30 para. 3.22). Smedley 
p 30 para. 3.22). His proposed regulation of corporate firms, reflecting principles of 
risk and compliance motivation, operates by reference to the likelihood and impact of 
failure. In most cases, Smedley predicted, corporate firms would have low levels of 
complaint by clients to the SRA and could be reasonably assessed as a low risk 
(Smedley, 2009; iv, recommendation 1). They have a low probability of regulatory 
failure, but with high impact when it occurs, a risk category suggesting regular, 
strategic systems level regulation. Therefore: 
 
'In the corporate sector, one might thus translate these objectives into the need (i) to reduce 
business risks which lead to poor client service; and (ii) to thereby reduce the risk of a general 
devaluing of the brand of solicitor, which is a risk to the wider public interest. These two 
objectives need to be combined with the other statutory objectives, including promoting 
competition and encouraging a strong, independent and effective profession.'  
(Smedley, 2009; para. 2.25) 
 
Another factor to consider is compliance motivation, which can be analysed with 
reference to different combinations of propensity and capacity. The appropriate 
regulatory regime for corporate firms, which have both a high motivation and high 
capacity, would lay down general principles and involve strategic supervision 
(Smedley, 2009; paras. 2.30-2.32).  
 
Smedley proposed creating a Corporate Regulation Group within the SRA, led by a 
Group Director recruited from the practice field or with strong regulatory experience 
in a comparable sector and with expertise supplemented by a Client and Practitioner 
Panel (Smedley, 2009; p. 47 para. 4.31). The Group would comprise Account 
Managers to visit firms, examine their business systems and issue low level 
sanctions as appropriate. Suspension or striking off, however, would continue to be 
exercised by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. Investigations would be focused and 
short – quickly identifying the issue, discussing the shortfalls with senior partners, 
and requiring assurances via system-wide remedial action. Detailed forensic 
investigations would be reserved for cases of very serious and deliberate 
malpractice (Smedley, p. 42 para. 4.12). Smedley feared that, although the SRA 
accepted his recommendations creating a specialist unit to handle large firms in 
principle, they would water them down in practice. He urged that, in that case, the 
Law Society should set up a separate regulator for corporate law firms (Smedley, 
2009; p. 54 para 5.5).  
  
Smedley expected his system of corporate regulation to apply only to the largest 
firms in terms of staffing and turnover, those dealing largely or exclusively with 
corporate clients (say, a minimum of 70% of its client base), and with high-level 
compliance and risk management systems in place, together with a designated 
senior Risk and Compliance Partner, or other partner carrying out a similar role. Hunt 
thought that a system of Authorised Internal Regulation (AIR), similar to the Smedley 
model, should be rolled out for all firms with compliance and governance processes 
that are sufficiently sophisticated and robust (Hunt, 2009; Rec. 41) initially larger, 
corporate firms (Hunt, 2009; Rec. 42). He also thought the SRA should gather 
information on the risks of sectors/constituted entities, and allocate the cost of 
regulation between individuals and those entities regulated (Hunt 2009 Rec. 38). 
Introducing his report in October 2009, Hunt welcomed many of Smedley's 
recommendations but sounded a note of caution on any regulatory measure that 
might divide the profession.  
 
Principles based regulation responds to a need to accommodate ABS, because it  
strikes a balance between regulating the entity and the individual (LSB, 2009).  At 
the end of 2009, the Chair of the Legal Services Board announced a consultation on 
alternative business structures, identifying three 'key protections' that would ensure 
that 'consumer interests are considered, best professional principles are 
safeguarded and the public interest protected' (Edmonds, 2009). These were a fit 
and proper test for non-lawyer owners and managers of legal practices, mandatory 
introduction of head of legal practice and head of finance and administration and 
widening the complaints handling system so that  complaints about the 'non-legal' 
activities of ABS can be presented to a new Office for Legal Complaints. The 
problems of employing non-lawyers alongside lawyers would be addressed by 
providing that compliance with legal professional privilege rules must be guaranteed 
by all.  
 
In June 2009 the SRA consulted on the shift of focus from the role and conduct of 
individual solicitors to role and performance of their employing organisation in the 
delivery of legal services (SRA 2009). The SRA accepted limitations of its 
procedures, such as the lack of management information on firms that would enable 
analysis of risk. It conceded that its approach to supervision was more focused on 
identifying detailed rule breaches as an end in itself, rather than assessing the 
outcome for clients and the public interest. It agreed  that its ethics culture 
encouraged dependence, with Ethics Helpline staff spending excessive time advising 
on detailed cases rather than empowering firms to decide, improving standards or 
protecting the interests of clients (SRA, 2009 para. 19). It accepted a need to assist 
firms in achieving standards , to focus on risk management systems and on senior 
managers rather investigation of rule breaches. It welcomed increased use of 
Regulatory Settlement Agreements as opposed to disciplinary sanctions (SRA 2009, 
paras 21-25). 
The SRA may have accepted so many of the failings laid at its door because the 
prize was becoming an approved authority for licensing Alternative Business 
Structures. The Law Society was a long time advocate of multi-disciplinary practice. 
A recent president said of ABS: 
 
 We consider this to be good for solicitors, for the users of legal services and for UK plc. We 
 are a global leader in selling legal services to the world' (Heslett, 2010).  
 
The Law Society may also have an ulterior motive for keeping the LSB, which is 
authorised to license direct if no approved regulator comes forward, out of frontline 
regulation. The SRA will not necessarily have jurisdiction over all ABS activity, only 
reserved legal activity, non-reserved legal activity undertaken by the ABS and non-
legal activity subject to conditions imposed by the SRA on its licence (SRA, 2009; 
para. 22). This commitment will, however, involve adapting the methodology for 
regulating individual solicitors to also regulating other kinds of lawyer and non-
lawyers in such organisations.  
 
The obvious solution to the problem of professions regulating non-members is to 
regulate organisations (or 'entities') rather than individuals and to create lines of 
accountability for their behaviour. In March 2009 the SRA implemented rules 
bringing into effect 'firm based regulation' whereby all legal practices, regardless of 
size, are regulated as a firm or 'recognised body' and subject to the SRA's 
Recognised Body Regulations (RBR), until then used for companies and limited 
liability partnerships. The composition and structure of recognised bodies, and the 
services they may provide, is also specified in the rules.9 So, for example, the 
business of a recognised body may consist only of the professional services 
provided by practising solicitors and/or lawyers of other jurisdictions.10 Individuals 
can only provide services through recognised bodies. The RBR were amended to 
enable both entities and individuals within them to be charged a fee in their 
practising certificate divided between regulation cost and compensation fund 
contribution.11  
One of the main mechanisms for enforcing standards across a range of 
organisations, and diverse personnel, is the obligation to appoint 'responsible 
officers' charged with ensuring internal compliance. Thus, LDPs are currently 
required to have a Head of Legal Practice. Presently, at least one manager must be 
a solicitor with a current practising certificate (Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 Rule 
14.01(2)(a)) and 75% of managers and beneficial owners must be individuals entitled 
to practise as lawyers of England and Wales, lawyers of Establishment Directive 
professions or RFLs ((Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 Rule 14.01(3)(a) and (b)). 
These mechanisms make individual ethical responsibilities also ‗system 
responsibilities‘ which it is the business of senior staff to deliver, thus laying the 
groundwork for accountability structures.  
In 2010 the SRA published three major consultations, the first seeking views on the 
intended move to Outcomes Focused Regulation (OFR) (SRA 2010a), the second 
outlining intentions for its practical implementation (SRA 2010b) and the third 
focusing on consequent changes to the code of conduct (SRA 2010c). The promise 
was a 'proactive, risk-based and proportionate regulation' and a flexible regime for all 
types of legal service providers, creating a new handbook of regulatory requirements 
that would facilitate a 'flexible regime for all types of legal service providers, enabling 
them to create the right controls given their own individual business models, 
structures and client bases (SRA 2010b; para 10). Despite the different statutory and 
practical bases for the regulation of first, recognised bodies and sole practitioners, 
and, second, ABS, the SRA considered that two regimes would create confusion for 
consumers and providers and would be expensive to operate (SRA 2010b; paras. 15, 
17 and 18). It was therefore proposed, contrary to the recommendations of Smedley 
and Hunt, to apply the new regulatory system to all those regulated by the SRA, from 
sole practitioners to ABS.  
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 Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 Rule 14 based on the requirements of sections 9 and 9A of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1985. 
10
 Or notaries public, where a notary public is a manager or employee of the recognised body. (see 
the limited exceptions provided by the Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007, Rule 21.03 (educational and 
training activities and authorship, journalism and publishing). 
11
 Rules made under Solicitors Act 1974 ss 79-80 and Administration of Justice Act 1985 ss 9-9A under 
paragraph 16 of Schedule 22 to the Legal Services Act 2007. For example, solicitors and RELs can only 
provide services to the public through a firm which is a recognised body or a recognised sole 
practitioner (both regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority) or through an authorised non-SRA 
firm (regulated by another approved regulator) (Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 Rule 12). 
 C. Regulatory system 
 
In October 2010 the SRA published the results of the consultations to date and 
offered a last chance to comment on the emergent regime (SRA 2010d). Although 
there were various objections raised to aspects of the proposals, most respondents 
were said to approve of the general direction of change. The Law Society raised 
some serious concerns about the move to outcomes focused regulation (SRA 2010d 
paras 73 and 83), but the SRA strategy announced in January 2010 was to deliver:  
  
(a) outcomes-focused regulatory requirements designed to give flexibility by avoiding unnecessary 
prescriptive rules on process, while giving clear guidance on what it is that firms must achieve for 
their clients;  
(b) an approach to the supervision of firms that helps firms achieve the right outcomes for clients, 
and that encourages firms to be open and honest in their dealings with us;  
(c) a high quality desk-based research and analysis capacity to assess the potential risks to the 
regulatory outcomes, supporting and leading the SRA's delivery of evidence-based and risk-based, 
proportionate regulation;  
(d) enforcement action which is prompt, effective, proportionate and creates a credible deterrent 
against failure to act in a principled manner. (SRA 2010a).  
 
The SRA is therefore embarked on a path moving closer to the LSB's agenda, but 
one of which the Law Society is not entirely convinced. Moreover, whereas Smedley 
advocated PBR only for corporate firms and Hunt thought it might be extended to the 
whole legal services sector in time, the SRA proposes that OFR becomes the 
system of solicitor regulation.  
 
The LSB, Hunt, Smedley and the SRA all cite the regulation of corporate law firms in 
New South Wales as evidence that PBR works (see e.g LSB 2009; para 36). A 
significant reduction in complaints, by as much as two thirds, was recorded against 
such firms after the introduction of the new system (Parker et al 2010). It should be 
noted, however, that only incorporated practices, operating under ordinary company 
law and with no restrictions on share ownership, are subject to this regime. The 
NSW system operates alongside more familiar frameworks of discipline, which 
remain the method of regulation for unincorporated firms.12 Therefore, in general, the 
focus of regulation and discipline remains the individual, who is still subject to 
substantially the same professional code and disciplinary system that preceded the 
introduction of measures for incorporated practices. Evidence that PBR will be 
successful in England and Wales as the sole method of regulation, or that it can be 
extended beyond specific kinds of firm, is thin at best.13 
 
The aspect of the regulatory system credited with a significant decline in complaints 
against incorporated practices is the system of self assessment against indicative 
criteria as to how far the practice complies with the 'ten objectives of sound legal 
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 Parker comments that 'the whole self-assessment regime only works because the lawyers 
responsible for filling it in fear individual disciplinary action if they do not do it properly – and because 
they understand that it is aimed at demonstrating that their firm has systems to make sure they are 
meeting the pre-existing rules...'. 
13
 Parker comments that there are not many true multi-disciplinary practices in NSW and data is not 
kept to enable analysis of their performance.  
practice' (Mark 2009).14 Gaps in a self- assessment against ten high level principles 
of good office practice and ethical behaviour is discussed with the regulator, the 
Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (OLSC). The data assists in developing a 
'risk profile' and enables targeting of high risk units. The OLSC can conduct general 
audits (including finance systems), but restricts compliance audits of appropriate 
management systems to 'practice reviews' of files and behaviour reflected in 
returned self assessment forms. Analysis of the complaints against such firms shows 
that it is the completion of the self assessment which triggers improvement in 
complaints records, rather than, for example, the fact of incorporation or creation of 
management systems (Parker, et al, 2010).  
 
In England and Wales the promise of PBR appears to be ‗lighter touch‘ regulation. 
Smedley states that PBR emphasises improving practices and raising standards, not 
punishing offenders after the event (Smedley p 43 para 4.17) while the SRA 
promised to remove restrictions not necessary for effective regulation and 
concentrate on the high level principles governing practice and the quality of practice, 
rather than 'tick-box‘ compliance with rules (SRA 2010a). Standard visits to 
organisations might therefore examine the evidence used for internal monitoring, e.g. 
results of audits and training or be thematic, for example, looking at client care or 
conflicts of interest. A stronger focus on client protection, high standards of service 
and areas of highest regulatory risk is promised, but the main feature that the NSW 
system shares with that proposed by the SRA is a focus on having 'appropriate 
management systems' in place (Parker et al 2010). The NSW regulator refers to this 
system as 'cultural regulation' (Mark, 2009) because it focuses on entrenching, 
promoting and 'more stringently‘ formalising ethical behaviour (Mark 2009; 14). 
 
The term 'ethical infrastructure' was coined by Schneyer (1998) and developed by 
Wilkins and Chambliss (2002; 2003) to describe the structures within firms that 
support ethical behaviour. In the US context Chambliss and Wilkins noted that rules 
geared to individual responsibility are not easily adapted to organisational 
accountability. Conventional disciplinary systems hold individuals to account. 
Disciplining managers before professional tribunals for organisational failures is 
difficult, at least to judge by the low number of reported cases. This is less of a 
problem in a system geared to regulating entities. Parker and Nielsen (2009; 5) 
found that ‗compliance management systems implemented thoroughly by competent 
management with plentiful resources, and combined with management commitment 
to the value of compliance, might make a difference to compliance, but good 
management and good values were more important than formal systems at 
influencing compliance management in practice and, ultimately, actual compliance'. 
The risk in creating ethical infrastructures,  shifting sanctions onto firms and 
appointing ‗compliance professionals‘ to ensure conformity with the regime is that 
practitioners may come to regard ethics as ‗external‘ and not their professional 
responsibility. 
 
The SRA must grapple with a significant level of law firm failure, including through 
dishonesty,  managed through existing processes (Chellel, 2008). Under the SRA 
proposals the right to discipline individual solicitors remains, but with the shift of 
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 For example, a criterion suggested for the first objective, 'competent work practices to avoid 
negligence', is that 'fee earners practise only in areas where they have appropriate competence and 
expertise' firms rate their practice from fully to partially compliant.  
focus from individual to corporate responsibility, sanctions on firms may mean that 
only the most egregious cases come to a disciplinary tribunal. The lesson of the 
financial services collapse is that a rigorous OFR regime requires ressources and 
teeth. As result of the change in regulation regime of the FSA, from PBR to OFR, the 
FSA was required to hire 350 new staff, creating a team of direct supervisors 1,200 
strong. The FSA regulates 20,000 firms compared with the SRA's 10,000, but the 
SRA proposes operating two systems, the new regime alongside a conventional 
disciplinary structure, while the FSA refers serious cases to the police. In addition to 
the cost of maintaining two systems, the problem of enforcement may be 
exacerbated by plans to abandon the traditional code, the basis of individual 
responsibility.  
 
C. The professional code 
 
As in most common law jurisdictions, the legal profession in England and Wales 
currently operates a simple ethical model based on the professional code, supported 
by education at training from the vocational stage onwards, and buttressed by a 
disciplinary system dealing with infractions. Solicitors and barristers are subject to 
separate codes and both are of fairly recent vintage, particularly given the age of 
both professional groups. The Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 represented a 
conscious effort to trim down the voluminous Guide to the Professional Conduct of 
Solicitors, last published in 1999 (Taylor). The bar is currently consulting on a 
revised code of conduct based on conventional rules (BSB, 2011). Given that there 
are strategies for regulating legal entities without abandoning codes (Chambliss, 
2001), the reasoning behind the decision to do so requires examination.   
 
The future of codes of conduct was not dwelt on by the Law Society's consultants. 
Hunt‘s priority was to produce clear policies for ensuring that, and criteria for 
evaluating, whether, the regulatory regime facilitated wider and speedier access to 
justice (2009; Rec. 5). Smedley argued that:  
 
‗… pages and pages of rules can create a passive, dependent culture. The focus shifts to 
filling in the form correctly, rather than thinking positively and creatively about how to meet the 
highest standards of conduct and service. Principles-based regulation, as advocated by the 
LSB in its draft Business Plan, focuses more on outcomes, allowing the regulated community 
latitude to achieve stated goals. The idea is to instil a culture of personal and corporate 
responsibility, maturity and commitment to higher standards.‘  
(Smedley, 2009; 22 para 2.40).  
 
Urging departure from 'narrowly framed rules', Hunt urged the SRA to prefer 
encouragement of better consumer information and consumer empowerment over 
formal rule-making. He proposed a 'reassessed' Rule 1, capable of being distributed 
on the back of credit-card sized cards and distributed to the profession, non-lawyers 
in ABS and to clients (2009; Rec. 4, 5 and 57), but it is doubtful that he thought this 
sufficient. He advised the SRA to undertake rigorous impact assessments and cost-
benefit analyses of all proposed rule changes (2009; Rec. 33), suggesting that he did 
not envisage rules disappearing altogether. Smedley proposed a single code of 
conduct with variations in respect of certain types of work (2009; p. 57 para. 6.1).  
 
When the SRA consulted on the new rulebook in 2010, it did not appear to envisage 
the end of rules. Indeed, it stated that the new system would 'not mean the abolition 
of all detailed rules...' but offer a high level structure 'combining the flexibility of 
Outcomes Focused Regulation with the certainty of rules' (SRA 2010b; para. 25). In 
particular, it was anticipated that rules might be needed in 'high risk areas' involving 
client's liberty or money. It was not clear until the SRA's later consultations (2020c) 
that principles-based regulation meant the end of rules in the conventional sense. 
 
When it produced its proposals for regulation of entities the SRA identified ten 
principles, the first six similar to the old rule 1, the last four reflecting the new focus 
on businesses: 
 
1. uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice; 
2. act with integrity; 
3. not allow your independence to be compromised; 
4. act in the best interests of each client; 
5. provide a proper standard of service to your clients; 
6. behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in you and in the provision of legal 
services; 
7. comply with your legal and regulatory obligations and deal with your regulators and ombudsmen 
in an open, timely and co-operative manner; 
8. run your business/carry out your role in the business effectively and in accordance with proper 
governance and sound financial and risk management principles; 
9. run your business/carry out your role in the business in a way that promotes equality and 
diversity and does not discriminate unlawfully in connection with the provision of legal services; 
10. protect client money and assets.(SRA 2010b) 
 
This high level of generality can cover the wide range of organisations, sectors and 
professions the SRA aspires to regulate, but the risk is that the principles will be 
stretched too far, producing inconsistency and insufficiently robust standards (Kinney 
1995, Casile and Davis-Blake, 2002).  
 
The proposed SRA code, publication of which will accompany the launch of ABS in 
2011, comprises sections devoted to different topics, for example, client care, 
equality and diversity and conflicts of interest. Each section will contain the relevant 
principle/s, mandatory outcomes that must be achieved, by firms and individuals, to 
comply with the principles and ‗indicative behaviours‘. Indicative behaviours are not 
mandatory, because it is recognised that outcomes might be achieved by different 
routes (SRA 2010b; para. 44). It was proposed that all regulatory requirements (code, 
Accounts Rules, Licensing Rules etc.) would be consolidated in one handbook, 
published online (SRA 2010c; para 29). The new 'rule book' would lift the 'binding 
regulatory requirements ("rules") to the level of principles and, repeating the now 
familiar mantra, it would therefore be less detailed and prescriptive, not 'hinder 
innovation' and support providers in achieving 'good outcomes for consumers and 
the public interest' (SRA 2010c para. 1 and 17(a)). It is important to consider how the 
new rule book is intended to operate and instructive to take the examples, client care 
letters and conflicts of interest, taken by both Smedley and Hunt to illustrate the need 
for changes in regulation.15  
 
In relation to client care, the thrust of the criticism is that the SRA‘s requirements, set 
out in Rule 2 of the Solicitors Conduct Rules 2007 are met by sending out long and 
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 Smedley cited the examples of client care and conflicts of interest to illustrate how the small 
business mindset of the SRA impacted on large firms. Hunt used them to justify the shift from rules to 
principles-based regulation. 
detailed client care letters, which are unnecessary for corporate clients. Smedley 
(2009; 31 para 3.23) reported that an unidentified firm spent over £13.5 million worth 
of partners' time a year sending such letters; an enormous figure, admittedly. Rule 
2.02 of the Solicitors Conduct Rules 2007 states:  
 (1) You must: 
 (a) identify clearly the client's objectives in relation to the work to be done for the client; 
 (b) give the client a clear explanation of the issues involved and the options available to the 
client; 
 (c) agree with the client the next steps to be taken; and 
 (d) keep the client informed of progress, unless otherwise agreed. 
 (2) You must, both at the outset and, as necessary, during the course of the matter: 
 (a) agree an appropriate level of service; 
 (b) explain your responsibilities; 
 (c) explain the client's responsibilities; 
 (d) ensure that the client is given, in writing, the name and status of the person 
dealing with the matter and the name of the person responsible for its overall supervision; and 
 (e) explain any limitations or conditions resulting from your relationship with a third party (for 
example a funder, fee sharer or introducer) which affect the steps you can take on the client's 
behalf. 
 (3) If you can demonstrate that it was inappropriate in the circumstances to meet some or all of 
these requirements, you will not breach 2.02. 
 (Solicitors Code 2007). 
 
The rule is primarily intended for the protection and information of infrequent users of 
solicitors, but it outlines good practice for whichever client is advised and is both 
clear and flexible. The final clause puts the burden of proof, showing that meeting 
the requirements was unnecessary, on the solicitor. A cautious response is to send a 
letter, the copy of which is evidence that the requirements have been met, but this is 
not a requirement. Indeed, the final clause offers complete exemption in appropriate 
cases, as does the final clause of the section requiring solicitors to give details of 
complaint procedures (Solicitors Code 2007; Rule 2.05). The guidance to rule 2, over 
seventy paragraphs, reinforces this, stating that writing is not required but should be 
considered. It suggests that information is given in a clear and accessible form, 
underlines that the rule is flexible about the extent of information provided, 
depending on the case, and advises against 'over-complex or lengthy terms of 
business letters' ((Solicitors Code 2007, Rule 2, Guidance notes 25, 12 and 13).  
 
The most relevant principles, outcomes and indicative behaviours regarding client 
care from the relevant chapter from the proposed new rule book are: 
 
 4 you must act in the best interests of each client; 
 5 you must provide a proper standard of service to your clients; 
 
Any number of outcomes are potentially relevant, but this sample below may be 
particularly so: 
 
 6) where you are providing legal and other services you explain to the client the relevant 
statutory and/or regulatory protections, if any, in relation to each service; 
 8) clients are informed of their right to complain to the Legal Ombudsman; 
 9) clients' complaints are dealt with promptly, fairly, openly and effectively; 
 10) clients are in a position to make informed decisions about the services they need, how the 
matter will be handled and the options available to them; 
 11) clients receive the best possible information about the likely overall cost of their matter; 
 
Relevant indicative behaviours include: 
 
 A. agreeing an appropriate level of service with your client; 
 B. explaining your responsibilities and those of the client; 
 C. ensuring that the client is told, in writing, the name and status of the person dealing with 
the matter and the name of the person responsible for its overall supervision; 
 D. explaining any commercial arrangements, such as fee sharing or referral arrangements, 
which are relevant to the client's instructions; 
 E. explaining any limitation or conditions resulting from your relationship with someone else 
(such as an introducer funder, or fee sharer or introducer) that affect what you can do for the 
client; 
 F. clearly explaining your fees and if and when they are likely to change; 
 J. warning about any other payments for which the client may be responsible; 
  L. where you are acting for a client under a fee arrangement governed by statute such as  a 
conditional fee agreement, telling the client about all relevant information relating to that 
arrangement; 
 M. where you are acting for a publicly funded client, disclosing all relevant information relating 
to the impact on costs of their publicly funded status; 
 R. informing the client at the outset how complaints, including complaints about your bill, can 
be made, the timeframe for doing so and to whom complaints should be addressed; 
 S. providing the client with a copy of the firm's complaints procedure on request;  
 
It will be seen that much of the present rule 2 reappears, but has been 
disaggregated into outcomes and indicative behaviours. As a result, it is more 
difficult to work out what is required. Moreover, as before, the burden is on the 
solicitor to show that the prescribed outcomes have been met, if not by the indicative 
behaviours, then in some other way. It is not clear that solicitors will be better off in 
demonstrating client care than they were under rule 2.02. Hunt (2009; Rec.14) 
proposed replacing the ―Rule 2 letter‖ with a more flexible disclosure requirement 
geared to the type of client. It is almost inevitable, however, that most will conclude, 
as before, that a client care letter would be a sensible way of evidencing the 'telling', 
'disclosing' and 'informing' required.  
The second area of annoyance for large firms, as disclosed to Smedley, concerns 
conflicts of interest. There was a longstanding prohibition on conflict situations where 
solicitors were instructed to act for both sides in the same matter (simultaneous 
conflict) or asked to act having previously represented a client on the other side 
(successive conflict) There were two bones of contention for City firms. First, in some 
cases of simultaneous conflict, commercial clients were content for firms to save 
costs by acting for both sides, subject to preserving confidentiality and consent. 
Second, in cases of successive representation conflicts, there was a feeling that the 
vast scale of the firms, the frequent movement of personnel between them and 
shopping around by clients, made the Law Society's conflict rule unworkable the 
product of another age. In short, large firms claimed they could ‗manage‘ conflicts of 
interest.  
In 2000, a City of London Law Society working party proposed a considerable 
relaxation of the conflict rules, including restricting the prohibition on acting in 
successive litigation to individual solicitors within firms (Griffiths-Baker 2002, 164-5). 
In 2002, Griffith Baker's research suggested that a majority broke the existing rules, 
prohibiting acting in situations of conflict, by deciding that they had not 'acquired 
relevant information' about the former client or because the rules were 'out of touch 
with commercial reality', while many who claimed compliance did not adequately 
understand the rules (Griffiths-Baker 2002; 10-11and p174).  The Solicitors Code 
2007 continued the general prohibition on acting in situations impinging on the ability 
to act in the best interests of each client (Solicitors Code 2007 rule 3.01 and 
3.01(2)b). Relaxation of the conflict rules was, however, achieved by allowing waiver 
of simultaneous conflicts (rule 302(2)) and specifying that successive conflicts must 
arise in the same or related matters (rule 3.01(2)a).  
The 2007 rules retained the idea that the firm was the critical actor in successive 
conflicts rather than the individual solicitor, but brought the desire of City firms to 
'manage' conflicts closer to fulfilment. This was a considerable concession from an 
ethical point of view. Even when it is possible to secure information so that it does 
not leak between cases, or the matters are not the same or related, or the solicitor 
believes there will be no detriment to former clients, opposing a former client in 
litigation might put them at a disadvantage. Knowing their personality and 
propensities, or the culture of an organisation is useful in judging the likely response 
to litigation (Boon and Levin, 2008; 206) and having a former confidante acting for 
the other side may have a psychological impact on a client .16   
Smedley reported that the main issue was that the rules exceeded the common law, 
mainly regarding the right to waive a conflict.17 Rather than considering the 
underlying principle, however, Smedley accepted the objection as legitimate, 
focusing on the alleged expense and accepting the excessiveness of conflict 
checking, estimated to be over £1million per annum by one unidentified firm 
(Smedley 2009; p. 32 para 3.28). Accepting that this is a credible figure, consent is a 
flawed solution at best. Informed consent depends on firms disclosing what it is that 
clients are consenting to, meaning that investigatory costs are unavoidable. The 
alternative, uninformed consent to conflicts, should be a step too far, even for the 
most relaxed regulator.  
Hunt (2009; Rec. 43) thought that the adoption of principles governing potential or 
possible conflicts of interest should be sufficient to protect clients and address the 
concerns of firms engaged in complex and/or multi-faceted corporate work. Judging 
from the SRA's proposals, he may well be right. The first consultation on the new 
rule book offered three models (SRA, 2010b; paras. 48-66). The SRA leaned heavily 
in favour of model 2 and the second part of the consultation confirmed this 
preference among respondents. Model 2 proposed the following outcomes in relation 
to non-substantive conflicts: 
 
 you have obtained each client's informed consent to act; and 
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 And see generally Ipp J. in Mallesons Stephen Jacques v. KPMG Peat Marwick and Others (1990) 
4 WAR 357 at 368 (cited by Griffiths Baker (2002;169)). 
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 It may also be said that the rules also exceed the common law by asserting a general principle 
against conflict situations rather than recognising that conflicts may not actually exist in all such 
situations (see Rakusen v. Ellis, Munday and Clarke [1912] 1 Ch 831 CA), for example, because it is 
possible to construct ‗Chinese walls‘ (See Boon et al 2008; Ch. 10, Griffiths-Baker (2002; Ch. 2).    
 you can act at all times in the best interests of each client; and 
 it is reasonable in all the circumstances to act for the client; and 
 you comply with your duties of confidentiality 
 
City firms finally have their way, in that they will be able to 'manage' conflicts of 
interest including by obtaining informed consent to act. This flexibility may possibly 
be at the expense of some of the more vulnerable clients of smaller entities, but the 
prejudice to their interests will only be revealed if inadequate processes are picked 
up by audit.   
It is not clear that the SRA‘s proposed solution to conflicts of interest regulation is 
based on thorough investigations and analysis of the issue or merely goes with the 
flow of regulatory relaxation. This raises the question of whether 'commercial 
interests, whether of the solicitor or the client, be a factor when determining the rules 
governing conflicts of interest?‘ (Griffiths Baker 2002; 166). The issue is particularly 
relevant to ABS, where the potential for cross-selling, for example, of financial 
services, is great. This was a matter of concern to Clementi (2004; Ch. F, para 53), 
who felt that a regulated entity owned by a bank should not act for a client on a 
matter where the bank had an interest. The SRA, however, expressed its dilemmas 
as follows: 
 
(a) how much flexibility should firms be given in determining when they [entities] can act 
in situations involving or potentially involving a conflict of interests? 
(b) how do we deal with the more detailed provisions which currently govern acting for 
seller and buyer and lender and borrower, etc.? 
 (c) should the requirements relating to conflicts be expressed as outcomes or  rules? 
 
 
The last of these is perhaps the most surprising, Clementi having acknowledged that 
'rules may still be necessary in high-risk areas‘ (2004; para. 26). The Law Society 
responded by observing that the existing conflict rules had developed considerable 
certainty, stating that it did 'not believe that in this instance, that an outcomes 
approach provides sufficient clarity‘ (SRA, 2010d; para. 83).  
 
Other respondents to the SRA's had objected to replacing rules with principles, 
including the consumer organisation WHICH (SRA 2010d; para.53). One 
respondent expressed concern that: 
 
' ... the removal of rules could lead to suggestions that certain conduct is justified by the 
outcome.' 
(SRA 2010d; para.45) 
 
The SRA‘s stance appeared to have hardened since its initial consultation paper and 
it responded that it ‗did not accept any need to return to prescriptive rules, 
particularly given that our primary concern is the end result - the outcome for the 
consumer' (SRA, 2010d; para. 90).  
 
It is questionable whether the SRA's draft rulebook achieves a good balance 
between flexibility and certainty. Although the Solicitors Accounts rules will be 
retained, of the more ethically orientated material, only the outcomes are mandatory 
and they lack detail. Taking the outcomes for conflicts of interest as an example, 
they are at too high a level of generality to apply as rules. Aggregation would not 
make a satisfactory code of conduct. In terms of conventional codes of conduct, the 
indicative behaviours occupy an ambiguous position between rule and guidance. 
With them, the SRA has created a rebuttable presumption that there is a right 
answer, or process, to respond to an ethical dilemma. In its response to the 
consultation on the proposed new rule book the Law Society argued that indicative 
behaviours had a semi-mandatory status, creating a risk that non-observance would 
be seen as non-compliance. The SRA's response, to remove mandatory language 
from the indicative behaviours, may reduce ambiguity but may also increase risk.  
 
It is not clear why, contrary to the views of many academic advocates of entity 
regulation, and key respondents to its consultation, the SRA is determined to turn its 
code of conduct into a manual for quality accreditation. There may be confusion 
between institutional and professional ethics (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), which 
Freidson argues must each pursue different goals.  Institutional ethics 'serve the 
transcendent values of the discipline' while professional ethics must 'claim an 
independence from patron, state and public that is analogous to what is claimed by a 
religious congregation' (1998; 219 and 221). In practical terms professional ethics 
represent concrete standards across the whole role, whereas institutional ethics are 
geared towards institutionalising processes in everyday work (Oost 2007). It would 
have been entirely possible to have retained the Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 
and issued guidance for inspection visits.  
According to Black, one of the lessons of the financial services crash is to escape 
from regulators' rhetoric and determine the relative roles of principles and rules. This 
is because  '[n]either principles nor rules usually function particularly successfully 
without the other' (Black 2010; 24). Prescriptive rules are forward looking, suiting 
circumstances where conduct might occur frequently in the absence of rules or 
where harm is potentially substantial and irreversible. Standards based approaches 
are backward looking, whereby the regulator only becomes involved ex post, suiting 
situations where conduct is widely varying and constant change demands flexibility 
(Decker and Yarrow, 64). Effective regulation depends on finding the right kind of 
rule for the purpose and considering how compliance will be achieved (Baldwin, 
1990). Broad principles may be sufficient to regulate the well-intentioned and well-
informed, but they provide ambiguity that others can exploit. It is important that 
specific and absolute rules are in place when there are references to the Crown 
Prosecution Service or Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. In principle, lawyers should 
know precisely what allegations they face when they are defending their professional 
reputations, but the absence of rules will make disciplinary cases more time 
consuming and difficult, inhibiting prosecution (Baldwin, 1990; 323) and leading to 
formal discipline being reserved for cases involving criminal behaviour.   
 
Authors arguing for more discretion in lawyers' ethical decision-making do not 
advocate the abandonment of rules. Nicolson (2006, p. 619-620), for example, 
argues that vague codes force lawyers to exercise discretion, growing 'moral muscle', 
but offer insufficient regulation and guidance. Thus, he proposes two codes, one with 
conduct norms and the other with ethical norms and discussion of how they might 
apply in different contexts. Codes of conduct also serve a range of other valuable 
purposes, from the symbolic to the practical. Even at a relatively high level of 
abstraction, like the American Bar Association Model Code (ABA, 2010), codes have 
greater symbolic meaning, appear more relevant to practitioners, as opposed to their 
employing organisation, and are a teaching resource. An audit manual speaks only 
to the regulated, or the management of the regulated, and is inaccessible to the 
public. If the affect of OFR is to reduce the emphasis on individual responsibility and 
discipline, the preservation of the professional principles will require a considerably 
enhanced role for education and training.      
 
 
D. Education 
 
An important factor in the training agenda of the professions will be the configuration 
of the market. For example, if the BSB were to become a regulator for advocacy it 
may decide to surrender its own vocational course, the Bar Professional Training 
Course, and admit only experienced practitioners, subject to some additional training 
and or assessment. This would fit with previous proposals for a common 
postgraduate vocational education of solicitors and barristers (ACLEC, 1996, 
Kerridge and Davis,  1999) and with Baroness Deech's suggestion that graduates 
should not choose the branch of the profession they wish to enter on graduation 
(Deech, 2010). Delayed specialisation in advocacy is consistent with Hunt‘s proposal 
that reserved legal activities be restricted to solicitors with separate authorisation, 
with consequent changes to the point at which the qualification of solicitor is awarded 
(2009, Rec. 68). He also suggested (2009, Rec. 58) that solicitors consult on 
creating a fellowship scheme for those reaching a higher professional standard. As 
with the advocacy proposal, this could mean that qualification processes could 
become extended, with numerous variations. Thus, common legal training could 
become extended before becoming more flexible, focused, and specialised and 
possibly extending into post-qualification.   
 
While the legal professions remain frontline regulators of education and training, the 
LSB has a statutory duty to 'assist in the maintenance and development of standards 
of education of authorised persons‘ (LSA, 2007, s.3(4)). The chairman of the LSB, 
David Edmonds, recently announced an overarching strategic review of education 
and training by the solicitors, Bar and Institute of Legal Executives (ILEX), the main 
para-legal organisation. He identified factors shaping legal education to 2020, 
indicated a number of areas that he thought legal education needs to cover and 
some issues for consideration, including routes to qualification that would encourage 
diversity in the profession. There were also a few clues to revised priorities in 
curriculum content, with 'management skills and commercial awareness' being one 
new entry. Referring to the 'changes to the market and the more sophisticated 
outcome-focused approach to regulation...' Edmonds suggested that '(a)s a 
minimum, we will be looking at a changed and earlier emphasis on the teaching of 
professional ethics and wider responsibilities to the client ...' (Edmonds, 2010).  
 
The professions have not previously sought to impose explicitly professional subjects 
on the academy, reserving their efforts for the vocational stage.. The Bar recently 
introduced a discrete ethics teaching and assessment to its new Bar Professional 
Training Course, while The Law Society commissioned academics, Economides and 
Rogers, to examine the place of ethical training in legal education and practice. Their 
report (2008) made twenty four recommendations for increasing the ethical content 
at all stages of legal education, all of which Hunt urged be taken seriously (2009; 
Rec. 73). One of the most significant was that legal ethics be introduced to the legal 
education process at the earliest stage possible (Economides and Rogers, 2009; 
Rec. 1). This repeated the ACLEC recommendation that Law Schools be set 
outcomes for coverage of ‗legal values and the moral content of law‘ (ACLEC, 1996). 
The Law Society then commissioned a further report to define legal ethics and flesh 
out a model undergraduate curriculum (Boon, 2011). This suggested that a suitable 
definition was:  
 
‗The study of the relationship between morality and Law, the values underpinning the legal 
system, and the regulation of the legal services market, including the institutions, professional 
roles and ethics of the judiciary and legal professions.‘ 
(Boon, 2011 p.19) 
The report also recommended that, if the profession continues to require coverage of 
discrete subjects for recognised law degree, that Legal Ethics so defined should be 
added to this core. This may antagonise an academy that is jealous of its own 
independence and wary of professional values (Burridge and Webb, 2007, Cownie 
2008, Pue, 2008). Implementation may therefore involve a possibly lengthy 
renegotiation of the Joint Statement on Qualifying Law Degrees (SRA 2002).  
The SRA has not yet acknowledged that OFR necessarily places greater emphasis 
on education and training, although both Smedley and Hunt had suggested this. 
Smedley summarised the educational implications of the shift to PBR as involving a 
shift in emphasis from ‗investigation, scrutiny and punishment‘ to ‗education, 
information, training, expert advice and promotion of standards‘ (2009; p. 22 para. 
2.40). Hunt said that moving from 'prescriptive regulation‘ to PBR requires more 
flexibility and 'a greater degree of judgment on the part of the individuals concerned‘ 
(Hunt 2009; para. 2.13). The vocational stage has previously offered a rather 
rudimentary pervasive treatment and assessment. Under OFR law students would 
be need to be taught to make professional ethical decisions in the context of 
organisational norms while also taking into account an overarching statutory duty in 
litigation or advocacy to act with independence in the interests of justice (Boon and 
Levin, 2008 p.346). Interpreting and balancing rules (or outcomes), while recognising 
where they conflict and how overarching principles come into play (Kupfer, 1996), 
demands considerable sophistication. In the absence of a detailed rule book, 
education and training would have a considerable gap to fill (Webb 2002; 149). This 
may require a shift from the deontological approach often associated with teaching 
ethics, based on formal rules,  to a novel approach, perhaps best described as 
‗situational‘, where overarching values are recognised. 
 
The SRA's initial consultation acknowledged a need to examine 'the appropriate 
balance between requirements for firm-based and individual and pre and post 
qualification education and training, particularly whether there is 'sufficient emphasis 
on principles, ethics and financial management at the pre-qualification stage' (SRA 
2009; para. 89). The 2009 consultation identified pre-entry education, the code of 
conduct, the complaints service and accreditation schemes, CPD, mandatory and 
voluntary accreditation schemes (SRA, 2009; para. 21) as key components in 
securing practitioner competence. Suggesting that these elements did not represent 
a 'coherent framework' (SRA, 2009; para. 3) the paper identified the need for further 
work to align them with the 'day one outcomes' of the training framework (SRA, 
2011). Anticipating Hunt, it also proposed formulation of a post-qualification 
framework with different standards of knowledge, skills and behaviours for the 
different roles that solicitors take in law firms (SRA 2009; para. 27). Anticipating also 
the adoption of 'better regulation' principles, placing responsibilities on providers for 
quality assurance (SRA 2009; para. 28) would involve developing standards for the 
management of the work environment (SRA 2009; para. 32-33). 
 
OFR will put both the profession and employers under pressure to provide education 
and training in management and ethics post-qualification. Despite a longstanding 
Continuing Professional Development (CPD) regime, there is presently little 
infrastructure,18 certainly not a 'deliberative moral community' built on a foundation of 
aspirational professional norms, supplemented by context specific codes' where 
necessary (Parker 1999; 171 citing Croft 1992; 1325). Hunt suggested measures 
that might be steps to building such a community, such as introducing a mandatory 
requirement that CPD should include elements focused on ethical standards, values 
and dissemination , (Hunt 2009; Rec. 77 and 78). Hunt also recommended that the 
SRA give greater prominence to Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) rulings (Rec. 
49-51and see Buck 2001), provide regular email updates and other forms of direct 
communication and replace call centre ethics guidance with named individuals or 
groups (Rec. 55 and 56). Such measures would need to be set in a regulatory 
strategy integrated with other stages in the education and training process.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The LSA has the potential to revitalise professionalism, particularly by replacing the 
previous hotchpotch of co-regulation with the Legal Services Board, which could 
encourage a thoughtful restructuring of legal services in England and Wales. If the 
only strategy for re-structuring is competition, however, planning will be rather too 
crude. In the meantime, a new regulatory methodology is emerging, supporting 
contradictory and possibly irreconcilable aims. The SRA is under various pressures 
to adopt OFR. This may help to preserve a single system of regulation for a large, 
diverse and fragmented profession, and accommodate ABS, while satisfying the 
demands of large, commercial solicitors firms, for a more customised, lighter touch 
regulatory regime. Yet key players doubt that the SRA can successfully regulate 
large firms,19 many large firms are not even sure that they want new-style regulation 
(Gibb 2009)20 and it may prove difficult and risky to extend the system to non-
commercial legal sectors. If achieving the key aims is difficult, reconciling them may 
be impossible. 
 
While many changes to the market are gathering momentum the switch from rule 
based to principles based regulation is arguably the most significant for conventional 
understandings of legal professionalism. This step, particularly combined with others, 
could drive fragmentation of the profession. For example, post-qualification 
specialisation together with the more abstract, principles based code, may 
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 Although large firms drove the Smedley agenda, and welcomed his proposals, some were 
undecided about seeking Authorised Internal Regulation status if it were offered by the SRA (Legal 
Risk, 2010). 
encourage specialist lawyers to develop their own, more detailed, ethics codes, 
exacerbating the difficulty of uniting under one ethics regime. The numerous impacts 
discussed in this article are represented diagrammatically in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The different emphases of rule-based and outcomes based regulation.  
    
Old New 
 
Profession-controlled Co-regulation 
Individual Entity 
Rules Principles 
Infractions Outcomes 
Observance Discretion 
Acts Indicative behaviours 
Investigation Accreditation 
Professional Responsibility Compliance 
Disciplinary Process Administrative Sanction 
Professional Community Ethical Infrastructure 
Heterarchy Hierarchy 
Deontological Situational 
 
The traditional organisation of professions is grounded in collegiality. This assumes a 
heterarchical structure, characterised by more horizontal, equal relationships, rather 
than a hierarchical structure.  Ethical norm generation occurs within bodies of 
practice and is translated by the professional body into rules of conduct.21 The new 
regulatory method allows a firm to negotiate ethical arrangements with the regulator, 
thus establishing a hierarchical relationship that validates each firm‘s individual 
interpretations of the principles of professional ethics. Firms may have a very 
different practice on a particular ethical issue than that of a neighbouring firm and 
divergence could magnify over time. The risk here is that the common ground of 
professional ethics is lost, with each firm becoming an ‗ethical silo‘. The problem is 
exacerbated because the principal relationship under this regulatory system is with 
the regulator rather than with professional peers. This potentially undermines the 
notion of ethics as the project and notional consensus of the whole professional 
community.  
 
The problem of dislocation of the process of professional norm generation is 
exacerbated by the separation of ‗representative‘ and ‗regulatory functions‘. This 
places both rule generation and enforcement within the regulatory arm, putting the 
representative side at arm‘s length from the process. The various reports discussed 
above, commissioned by the Law Society suggest a strong desire to influence the 
SRA. Law Society objections to the SRA‘s consultation proposals were gently 
rebuffed. The head of the SRA recently said that he would not recommend 
separation of functions as a modus operandi for professional bodies with a choice in 
the matter (Plant 2010). One way to counteract a drift away from professionalism is 
to create more profession-wide mechanisms and institutions (Parker 1999; 145), for 
example, using peer review in entity regulation (Kinney, 1995; Scrivens 1995, 1996; 
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 It is true that in more recent times these norms have been filtered through the professional bodies, 
but suggested changes have generally emanated from practitioners. 
Casile and Davis-Blake, 2002). An ethical focus for this activity might prevent firms 
falling into the narrow, parochial approach that entity regulation may encourage and 
help to preserve the normative dimension of legal professionalism.  
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